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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY 
STATE OF GEORGIA 
MATTHEW H. PATTON, 
Plaintiff, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Civil Action File No. 2016CV270046 v. 
RICHARD W. MORGAN, 
Defendant. 
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR PARTIAL JUDGMENT 
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Judgment on the 
Pleadings. Upon consideration of the motion and briefs submitted the Court finds as follows: 
In 1996, Plaintiff Matthew Patton ("Patton") and Defendant Richard Morgan ("Morgan") 
formed PeaPla, LLC ("PeaPla"), which was responsible for purchasing and renovating the 
Dillon Building, a commercial property in North Carolina. Patton and Morgan had equal 
interests in the company as co-owners. After purchasing the Dillon Building, PeaPla soon 
acquired two surrounding parcels of property which were to be used as parking for future tenants 
and customers/clients at the Dillon Building. 
From 2001 to 2002, Patton provided Morgan a series ofloans to help Morgan in 
connection with a business unrelated to PeaPla called NutriNet. Morgan executed at least 
twenty-six Secured Promissory Notes payable to Patton for the loans Patton provided. In 
addition, Morgan executed a Membership Interest Pledge Agreement ("MIP A") in which 
Morgan pledged to Patton his membership and other equity interests in PeaPla as security for at 
least seventeen of the Secured Promissory Notes. Pursuant to the MlP A, Patton is to receive "all 
of [Morgan's] right, title and interest in and to a limited liability company known as PeaPla, 
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LLC" upon default by Morgan on the repayment of loans. Patton claims that he has 
communicated to Morgan several times over the past years Patton's demand that Morgan pay 
Patton in full for the principal and interest owed on all of the Notes. By letter dated January 6, 
2015, Patton again communicated to Morgan the demand to immediately pay in full the principal 
plus interest arising out of the Notes. Morgan has yet to fulfill his obligations in the Notes to pay 
Patton upon demand. 
In July 2015, PeaPla sold the two parcels of property used as parking lots for the Dillon 
Building to Wexford Scientific. Unbeknownst to Patton, Morgan had caused additional parcels 
of property which surrounded those previously owned by PeaPla to be part of the sale of parcels 
to Wexford. Morgan had allegedly secretly acquired these additional parcels in his wife's name. 
Certain proceeds from the sale were placed in escrow and a dispute has arisen as to who is 
entitled to the distribution of proceeds from the sale. 
Through his Complaint, Patton seeks judgment against Morgan for the unpaid amount of 
the Notes, as well as a declaratory judgment that a certain amount held in escrow be awarded to 
Patton in partial payment of the Notes. In his Answer, Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaims, 
Morgan alleged numerous claims against Patton, including claims for breach of a confidential 
relationship, breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty; Morgan also seeks an accounting. 
Patton now moves for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings in relation to the counterclaims against 
him. 
Judgment on the pleadings is proper when undisputed facts in the pleadings entitle the 
movant to judgment as a matter oflaw. See O.C.G.A. § 9-11-12(c); Rolling Pin Kitchen 
Emporium, Inc. v. Kaas, 241 Ga. App. 577,577(2) (1999). "[A]ll well-pleading material 
[factual] allegations of the opposing party's pleading are to be taken as true, and all [factual] 
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allegations of the moving party which have been denied are taken as false." Id. (citing Morgan 
v. Wachovia Bank, 237 Ga. App. 257, 258(2) (1999)). The grant ofa motion for judgment on the 
pleadings "is proper only where there is a complete failure to state a cause of action or defense." 
Pressley v. Maxwell, 242 Ga. 360, 360 (1978). The Court may consider exhibits to the complaint 
or answer. Lapolla Indus. Inc. v. Hess, 325 Ga. App. 256, 258(2) (2013) (citations omitted). 
Patton claims that he is entitled to partial judgment on the pleadings because he did not 
owe any fiduciary duties to Morgan as a matter of law and because the claims brought by 
Morgan are derivative claims that fail to comply with North Carolina's pre-conditions to 
bringing a derivative suit. In Morgan's Counterclaims he alleges that by virtue of their decades- 
long personal and business relationship a confidential relationship existed between Morgan and 
Patton by which Patton owed duties to Morgan. Patton argues he could not have owed a 
fiduciary duty to Morgan as a manager of an LLC while Morgan seeks to establish the existence 
of a confidential relationship based on the totality of the circumstances of the decades-long 
business and personal relationship between the parties. 
Under Georgia law, "any relationship shall be deemed confidential, whether arising from 
nature, created by law, or resulting from contracts, where one party is so situated as to exercise a 
controlling influence over the will, conduct, and interest of another or where, from a similar 
relationship of mutual confidence, the law requires the utmost good faith, such as the relationship 
between partners, principal and agent, etc." Stamps v. JFB Properties, 287 Ga. 124,126 (2010). 
"Such relationships may be created by law, contract, or by fact." Id. "The determination as to 
whether a confidential relationship exists as defined by O.C.G.A. § 23-2-58 is a question for the 
trier of fact ... " Id. 
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Taking the allegations of the opposing party as true, Morgan has sufficiently pled the 
existence of a confidential relationship by which Patton owed duties to Morgan. As such, 
Patton's motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the breach of confidential relationship and 
breach of fiduciary duty claims is DENIED. 
Patton also seeks a judgment on the pleadings as to the breach of confidential 
relationship/fiduciary duty counts and accounting/litigation expenses claims on the theory that 
Morgan has failed to comply with North Carolina's pre-conditions to bringing a derivative suit. 
However, Morgan is not bringing these claims against Patton on behalf of any business entity; 
they are instead brought on behalf of Morgan individually. The gravamen of the breach of 
confidential relationship/fiduciary duty counts is that Patton wrongfully forced Morgan to forego 
receipt of his share. of the proceeds of the sale of the Wexford lots by placing Morgan's money in 
escrow. These are claims brought by Morgan individually against Patton; they are not brought 
on behalf of PeaPla. 
Further, through the accounting claim, Morgan seeks an accounting of funds received by 
Patton from Morgan from January 10,2001 through the date of the filing of Patton's Complaint. 
Morgan seeks this accounting for the purpose of determining whether Morgan owes unpaid 
money to Patton on the Notes; Morgan claims he has paid Patton any and all money due. 
Clearly, the accounting claim is not brought against Patton on behalf of Pea Pia, as Morgan seeks 
an accounting of all money paid by Morgan, individually, to Patton for expenses unrelated to the 
operation of Pea PIa. Additionally, the litigation expenses claim against Patton is brought 
individually by Morgan, as Morgan claims Patton has caused Morgan, not PeaPla, unnecessary 
trouble and expense. 
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The claims brought by Morgan in his Counterclaims against Patton are not derivative 
claims. As such, Patton's motion for judgment on the pleadings is DENIED. 
SO ORDERED, this 27th day of May, 2016. 
~\<,~~~ 
MELV:WESTMORELAND, SENIOR JUDGE 
Superior Court of Fulton County 
Atlanta Judicial Circuit 
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